The Hutton Report - unanswered questions

by

Stuart Yates

The Hutton Report (HR) leaves us with the same feeling as when we finish a poor detective novel. The author reveals the guilty party (ies) and who were innocent bystanders but we are unconvinced: the internal logic of the novel does not ring true. The thoughts and questions remain: could it have been like that; surely he would have....; I can't see how he.....; surely the butler was there.... etc. I certainly have a few questions that trouble me concerning the interpretation and conclusions reached on some issues. Time does not permit a comprehensive review of all that I find disturbing, what appears below is just the more obvious areas that are puzzling. All the quotes are from the Hutton Report itself, in other words, all the supporting evidence is from Lord Hutton's own selection from the mass of evidence at his disposal.

The '45 minute claim' timescale

The first draft of the dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction referred to in HR is dated 20/6/2002 (HR, par 170, page 107) and it contained no reference to this claim as the intelligence was not available. The '45 minute claim' intelligence became available on August 29th 2002 according to Sir Richard Dearlove, Chief of the SIS (HR, par 177, page 112). The dossier apparently lay untouched from June 26th although, according to Lord Hutton, assessments on Iraq continued during the summer: "during the spring and summer of 2002 the draft paper was regularly updated by the assessment staff" (HR, par 166, page 106). Tony Blair announced on September 3rd that the Government would publish a paper on Iraq's WMD capability in the next few weeks (HR, par 171, page 108). The June 20th draft was assessed by intelligence staff on September 4th and the new draft dossier on September 5th did contain a reference to the '45 minute claim'. So new intelligence was received, assessed and incorporated into a draft document intended for general publication in just five working days, ie from August 29th to September 5th.

Lord Hutton apparently sees these events as just background details and indeed, without all the other issues concerning the dossier, this may have been a reasonable conclusion to draw. However, there is another, quite plausible conclusion that can be reached: when the Government heard about the '45 minute claim' the reaction was 'ah, now we have something really significant and attention-grabbing to publish'. This conclusion is strengthened by the way in which the dossier was hardened up in relation to this claim (see below) and by the history of the dossier: Tony Blair had been promising a dossier for months but not producing it in spite of pressure.

So I believe that it is a perfectly reasonable conclusion to reach that the Government attached great importance to this piece of intelligence. There was a vested interest in this information being published and for it to be published in as strong a form as possible. It would be interesting to know how long it takes generally in a new piece of intelligence, particularly one as significant as this, to pass through an assessment and checking process before being released to the politicians. Five working days? Or more? HR showed no curiosity on this aspect. Judges, whether in civil or criminal courts, are skilled in assessing evidence against possible motives: again Lord Hutton showed no curiosity on this point in relation to both the Government and the Civil Service. If he had, he would surely have been more alive to the possibility of undue Government pressure on the intelligence services to come up with the 'right' answers. Why Lord Hutton did not see fit to question motives is another unanswered question.

The evolution of the '45 minute claim'

The dossier went through a series of drafts and HR kindly quotes from these drafts. The italics are mine.

The draft of September 5th contained the phrase "Intelligence also indicates that from forward-deployed storage sites, chemical and biological munitions could be with military units and ready for firing within 45 minutes" (HR, par 199, page 127)

The draft of September 9th contained the phrase "Intelligence also indicates that chemical and biological munitions could be with military units and ready for firing within 20-45 minutes" (HR, par 200, page 127)

The draft of September 10th contained the phrase "Within the last month intelligence has suggested that the Iraqi military would be able to use their chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so" (HR, par 201, page 128)

The draft of September 16th contained the phrase "The Iraqi military may be able to deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so" (HR, par 203, page 128)

The draft of September 19th contained the phrase "Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so" (HR, par 205, page 129)

The draft of September 20th contained the phrase "Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so " (HR, par 207, page 131)

The final version of the dossier, published on September 24th contained the phrase "Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so" (HR, par 22, page 7)

These changes do not appear to stem from the originator(s) of the drafts, where one would expect the words to be either radically changed - in the light of a re-examination for instance - or changed maybe once or twice. However, we see "could be" metamorphose to "would be able" to "may be able" to "are able" which would either indicate that a closer examination of the original intelligence supports that change - which implies three separate re-examinations - or, more likely, acceding to outside pressure. At the very least, "indicates", "suggests" and even at one point "20-45 minutes" as well as the evolution from "could" through to "are" point to muddle. So, was the interpretation of the intelligence muddled - and largely on this basis the UK went to war - or was the information 'sexed up' by the Government? I use 'sexed up' in Lord Hutton's alternative definition (HR, par 467, page 320) which he chose not to apply to Andrew Gilligan's reports but which he clearly thinks is acceptable, apart from his speculation about the subconscious workings of Mr Scarlett's mind. (HR, par 467, page 320). Subconscious processes presumably carry no censure or blame, even against those responsible for the activation of those subconscious processes.

One such responsible for Mr Scarlett's subconscious processes was Alastair Campbell, who sent a minute on September 17th to Mr Scarlett with sixteen points requesting changes to and making comments on the draft at that stage together with "In addition officials in 10 Downing Street and officials in the FOC sent a number of mails to their colleagues about drafting points in the dossier" (HR, par 212, page 134). It can be noted that the stronger "are able" appears after September 17th, the September 16th draft reads "may be able". Cause and effect? Who knows, but this change is not simply a matter of alternative words: "are able" reads as fact, fact whose source is said to be from the impartial and non-political intelligence services, whose purpose is to establish facts and to make it clear when they are providing judgements rather than facts.

Double standards

I have already referred to Lord Hutton choosing to define 'sexing up' as an accusation of lying, thus condemning Andrew Gilligan and at the same time exonerating the Government by saying that the alternative definition would not condemn the Government, which seems a little like 'heads I win, tails you lose'. (HR, par 467, page 320) The double standards go further. Andrew Gilligan, even in his first interview at 6.07am, said "Clearly, you know, if erm, if it, if it was wrong, things do, things are, got wrong in good faith but if they knew it was wrong before they actually made the claim, that's perhaps a bit more serious" (HR, par 32, page 12) At 7.32am Andrew Gilligan also said "But you know, it could have been an honest mistake, but what I have been told is that the government knew that claim was questionable, even before the war, even before they wrote it in their dossier" (HR, par 32, page 13) and he did not repeat the assertion at 6.07am that the Government "probably, erm, knew that the forty-five minute figure was wrong" (HR, par 32, page 12)

Later that day, John Humphreys made the 'allegation' rather more specific to the Armed Forces Minister: "Can I tell you what the allegation was because I think you may have been a little misled on that. The allegation was not that it was concocted by No10, the allegation was that a report was produced. It went to No10. It was then sent back to be sexed up a little, I'm not using my own words, but the words of our source, as you know. Now, given that, is it possible that....." He was interrupted by "Well it's not true that, that allegation" (HR, par 32, page 14).

So Andrew Gilligan was certainly not as black and white in his allegation as is assumed - certainly not as black and white as is the "are able" phrase, but, perhaps because he is a journalist, or assumed to be out to get the Government, or whatever views Lord Hutton has of him, he is not given any benefit of the doubt. A Government Minister denied an allegation of "sexed up a little", on the same morning as Andrew Gilligan's report. "Sexed up a little" would appear to come within Lord Hutton's approved definition of Government influence - matters of presentation - but this denial was not worthy of comment, even in terms of mitigating the BBC's response to the Government's attacks following the broadcast.

John Humphrey's question indeed comes very close to what Susan Watts said Dr Kelly told her and Lord Hutton accepts specifically that her transcript is accurate (HR, par 36 page 16) David Kelly said, in relation to the '45 minute' claim: "They were desperate for information.......they were pushing hard for information which could be released...that was one that popped up and it was seized on....and it was unfortunate that it was...." "I was uneasy with it" "..word-smithing is actually quite important and the intelligence community are a pretty cautious lot on the whole but once you get people putting it/presenting it for public consumption then of course they use different words" "....people at the top of the ladder didn't want to hear some of the things..." (HR, para 36, page 17). In relation to the 'Campbell' claim, Susan Watts asked "So would it be accurate then, as you did in that earlier conversation, to say that it was Alastair Campbell himself who?", to which Dr Kelly replied "No, I can't. All I can say is the No 10 Press Office. I've never met Alastair Campbell so I can't..(SW interrupts: so they seized on that?) But, I think Alastair Campbell is synonymous with that press office because he's responsible for it". (HR, para 36, page 17-18)

I do believe that most people reading this would draw the conclusion that Dr Kelly, by acknowledgement not only an expert in the field, but one who contributed to the dossier and was involved in its drafting, believed that the No 10 Press office, which he equated with Alastair Campbell, pressured the intelligence staff, altered the wording and did not listen to doubts. I believe also that most people would accept that it was in the public interest to publish such views, given the seriousness of the issue: justifying war, as such views were being expressed by such a senior person. Andrew Gilligan was accurate in reflecting those views, apart from that one phrase at 6.07am. On that one phrase alone, Lord Hutton condemns the BBC and exonerates the Government, but fails to take into account the fact that most of the report was not only accurate but that the doubts expressed by the intelligence community were well-founded.

The Government and the Civil Service however do not have to pass such stringent tests.

"Some commentators have referred to answers by the Prime Minister to questions from members of the press travelling with him on an aeroplane to Hong Kong on 22nd July...............I consider that the answers given by the Prime Minister to members of the press in the aeroplane cast no light on the issues..." (HR par 411, page 287) This you will recall is about Tony Blair denying on the 'plane that he had anything to do with the naming of Dr Kelly whilst Sir Kevin Tebbit states to the Hutton Enquiry that Tony Blair chaired the meeting which determined that the decision that led to the naming of Dr Kelly was taken at No 10 ("The decision was taken at a meeting in No 10 at which the Ministry of Defence concurred" (HR par 404, page 285 )). Again there is not only a lack of curiosity about the discrepancy but Lord Hutton goes out of his way to clear the Prime Minister on the very much narrower charge that he knew about the Question and Answer method - there is no evidence that he did know. There is however a clear discrepancy between what Tony Blair is reported to have said on the 'plane and what HR shows to have happened in terms of Tony Blair's involvement in the principle of publishing a statement which inevitably led to the naming of Dr Kelly, but Lord Hutton chooses to ignore that.

Geoff Hoon stated on August 27th to the enquiry that he did not see the Q & A document issued to the press (HR, par 419 and par 420, page 290). When Ms Pamela Teare, Geoff Hoon's Director of News gave evidence of a briefing meeting on July 9th at which Geoff Hoon was present, she "could not recall" if Geoff Hoon saw the Q & A document; she thought it "highly likely" that she "would have outlined some of the material in the Q & A" and that she thought she would have had the document with her at the meeting and that "he may have had it already" (HR, par 424, page 292). It is true that Richard Taylor, a special advisor to Geoff Hoon believes that the subject was not discussed at that meeting (HR par 425, page 293) but the supporting evidence is mixed to say the least. Yet Lord Hutton blithely declares Geoff Hoon innocent, no doubts or caveats.

Dr Kelly himself is also judged harshly. He is deemed to have broken Civil Service rules - and I am not arguing that he did not - by talking to journalists. The rules, elucidated by Mr Patrick Lamb, again quoted helpfully by Lord Hutton, state that if prior permission is not obtained, the contact must be revealed afterwards. (HR, par 250, page 169). Apparently Dr Kelly was "very scrupulous" (HR, par 250 , page 168 ) about this and indeed told Mr Lamb of his conversations with Andrew Gilligan and Susan Watts in the same month that they had taken place (HR, par 251, page 69). In addition, Dr Kelly's employment status was complicated - reporting to two areas of the Ministry of Defence and to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (HR, par 253, page 170). However, these are not regarded in any way as mitigating factors: Dr Kelly was "in breach of the Civil Service code of procedure which applied to him" (HR, par 467, page 321). Full stop.

Let us look at the general double standard. The Government is innocent when it publishes something which is untrue from a single source because it did not know it was untrue. The BBC is guilty when it publishes something which is untrue from a single source when it did not know it was untrue.

Other Questions

In HR par 407, page 286, Lord Hutton actually makes a very closely reasoned argument of his own as to why and how the Government might have had a strategy to name Dr Kelly but then concludes, without any specific counter-arguments, that this was not so. Why did Lord Hutton choose to include this in his report? He had already decided to judge the Government on the very narrow grounds of "Did the Government behave in a way which was dishonourable or underhand or duplicitous in revealing Dr Kelly's name..." (HR, par 292 , page 215) and acquit them on that.

In a normal court of law, which this of course was not, the case is heard on the basis of the charge(s) (criminal) or the claim(s) (civil) brought, the evidence is then heard and judgement reached. In the case of the Hutton Enquiry, as stated in Lord Hutton's definition of his terms of reference (HR, par 9-12, page 2-3) there is no mention of such narrow terms as outlined above. In other words, Lord Hutton appears to have heard the evidence then formulated the cases against the various parties - cases which criticise all parties except the Government and the Civil Service. This is a curious way of proceeding. Moreover, Lord Hutton goes out of his way (HR, par 11, page 3) to say he has deliberately included extracts of the transcripts so that the public can see the reasons from the evidence for his conclusions, yet there are so many extracts that do not point towards his conclusions.

Conclusion

There are many unanswered question relating to the Hutton Report but there is one, overwhelmingly baffling, question. As I stated, all the quotes I have used are from the report, not from the enquiry as a whole. So the question is this: why did Lord Hutton deliberately select that material, which points to other conclusions, why did he make his definitions and narrowing of the issues so transparent? He could have chosen other material, left parts out, in order to create a consistent internal logic, which could only have been disputed by looking at evidence from outside the report. It is almost as if he is saying: 'Read between the lines and see the conclusions I would have come to if I could have done', but this raises yet another question and is only one possibility amongst many. Only Lord Hutton knows why he structured the report as he did and how and why he drew the conclusions he did and I guess he will not be revealing that, at least not yet.

February 2004